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Morphosemantics in Latin: A Case for Superveridicality

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List of Abbreviations

1	First person (I/ego)	INF	Infinitive Mood
2	Second person (you/tu)	NEG	Negative particle
3	Third Person (he/she/it/ille)	NOM	Nominative Case
ABL	Ablative Case	PART	Participle
AcI	*Accusativus cum infinitivo* (Accusative-Infinitive Construction)	PassPeri	Passive Periphrastic
AG	Allen & Greenough 2001	pl	Plural
BA	Mountford 2001	PRON	Pronoun
DAT	Dative Case	PTL	Particle
GEN	Genitive Case	sg	Singular
IND	Indicative Mood	SUBJ	Subjunctive Mood

The Rules of *Oratio Obliqua*[1]

When an author writes in indirect discourse (*oratio obliqua*) in Latin, he shifts the reported speech into the accusative with infinitive (*Accusativus cum infinitivo*, AcI) construction. *Oratio obliqua* can be triggered by verbs of saying, thinking, knowing, believing, or feeling, otherwise called *verba dicendi*. When there is a clause embedded in reported speech in *oratio obliqua*, the verb in the embedded clause commonly falls into the subjunctive mood. It could be argued that the use of the subjunctive shows either subordination or some doubt on the part of the author who is reporting someone else's opinion. The *oratio obliqua* shows that it is not necessarily the author's perspective, but is true in the mind of the reported speaker. This allows the author to remove the responsibility of the statement from himself. A verb will not shift into the subjunctive in the subordinate clause if the proposition of the clause is so true that the author agrees. I will show in this paper that the modal shift into the subjunctive is a result of morphosemantics instead of morphosyntax.

The grammar of Latin and the meaning of certain words differently affect the way Latin morphology works. When the grammar of Latin dictates that a direct object of a verb be in the accusative case, this is an example of morphosyntax – the syntax of Latin has rules that affect the morphology. When the meaning of a sentence affects the morphology, i.e. sequence of tense rules, this is an example of morphosemantics. Our natural assumption would be that modal shift

in *oratio obliqua* is a result of subordination, a morphosyntactic shift, but I will show that it is in fact morphosemantic, as it is the strength of the claim's truth which triggers the subjunctive.

Most languages gauge the level of truth a statement has on a scale of veridicality. (Giannakidou 1997, 1998) Statements which are not true are deemed *averidical*, and those which are true are *veridical*. Sentences which cannot be adequately analyzed as true or false are *nonveridical*. I will argue for the existence of a categorization in Latin semantics called *superveridicality*, which covers statements that are considered to be true by both the author and the reader. Superveridicality exists separate from veridicality and averidicality and interacts with the morphology differently as well. I will use the discussion of superveridicality to analyze specific rhetorical examples in Caesar, Cicero, and Sallust.

In this paper we will be dealing with these environments within the parameters of indirect discourse. Bradley's Arnold (Mountford 2001) uses (1) and (2) to show how to form a sentence in indirect discourse. (1) represents the reported phrase independent of *oratio obliqua* and (2) shows that same phrase when it is attributed to another speaker.

(1)   *Oratio Recta*
        stultus   est   qui   hoc   facit.
        stupid.NOM is.3.sg.IND wh-.NOM this.ACC does.3.sg.IND
        He who does this is stupid.

(2)   *Oratio Obliqua*
        Quintus   dicit   stultum   esse   qui   hoc   faciat.
        Quintus.NOM says.3.sg.IND stupid.ACC be.INF wh-.NOM this.ACC does.3.sg.SUBJ
        Quintus says he who does this is stupid.

The main phrase of (1), 'stultus est,' falls into AcI in (2), 'stultum esse.' The main verb of the embedded phrase, 'facit,' changes its mood to the subjunctive, 'faciat.' We can divide (2) into the following parts: the *verbum dicendi*, the reported phrase, and the embedded clause:

(3) [Quintus dicit]*verbum dicendi* [stultum esse [qui hoc faciat]embedded clause]reported phrase

I will be using this nomenclature throughout the paper.

There are many examples when the verb of the embedded clause does not shift to the subjunctive but rather remains in the indicative. What are the environments when a verb stays in the indicative, and how do they compare to the environments when a verb shifts to the subjunctive? Could the reason be as simple as subordination? In this paper, I will show that the subjunctive is not used to show subordination, but rather to make a semantic distinction regarding the truth of the reported information. I intend to argue that the subjunctive is used commonly in Latin to show nonveridicality, but that in *oratio obliqua* the subjunctive can be used to also show veridicality. For the sentences which use the indicative instead of the subjunctive, I will argue that the main purpose of this distinction is show superveridicality. Superveridicality is a semantic classification which I will define and show to exist in Latin. Lastly, I will show that notions of superveridicality are useful for analyzing rhetoric in Latin. Superveridicality allows authors to make assertions using the distinction between the indicative and subjunctive in order to bolster their argument.

Traditions of Latin Semantics: Classicists and Linguists

There are two separate traditions of analyzing Latin grammar. There is the Classicist tradition which describes surface structure of Latin and the rules governing the mood of verbs, case of nouns, and the reasons for certain constructions. The Classicist tradition has produced comprehensive grammars such as Allen and Greenough's *New Latin Grammar* (first edition 1888), the Kuhner-Stegman (Kuhner 1879), and *Latin Prose Composition* (first edition 1938) written by Thomas Arnold and edited by George Bradley, Sir James Mountford, and others. Albert Harkness' discussion "On the Development of the Latin Subjunctive in Principle Clauses"

(1879) is a primary example of the style of syntactic analysis in the Classicist tradition. These grammars and academic articles served to describe the semantic and pragmatic effects mood and tense choice bore on certain constructions. These discussions were very useful to understanding Latin better, but lacked a descriptive linguistic metalanguage that would have made the discipline more uniform in the analyses. While Allen and Greenough, Bradley's Arnold, etc. are very descriptive texts, they do not use modern semantic classifications. I will only be using the texts as a guideline for rules of grammar and finding useful examples.

In the last fifty years semantics has grown as a field within Linguistics. Academics have begun to study how meaning affects the way we use language. *Latin Syntax and Semantics* by Harm Pinkster (1990) establishes a general overview to the subject of Latin linguistics. Pinkster touches on the topic of AcI with three-place predicates with embedded phrases. He compares *verba dicendi*+AcI+prolative infinitive with the *verba dicendi*+AcI+ut-clause, but does not go further than saying that the constructions are in opposition to AcI. Pinkster also discusses the illocutionary force of the subjunctive mood and claims that subjunctive seems to be a mood reserved for non-factive (nonveridical) sentences.

Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta by François Recanati (2000) is primarily a pragmatic and semantic text. He discusses what *oratio obliqua* in a variety of languages can do in terms of how speakers use it. Recanati 2000 is a crucial text for understanding the role of worlds in *oratio obliqua*.

Anastasia Giannakidou's *The Landscape of Polarity Items* (1997) and *Polarity Sensitivity as (Non)veridical Dependencies* (1998) address negative polarity items and veridicality. Her studies discuss how veridicality, nonveridicality, and averidicality all affect negative polarity items and specifically how mood can affect a context-sensitive definition of veridicality. What

will prove to be most interesting is the application of Giannakidou's definition of veridicality in relation to Recanati's theory of worlds.

Definition of Semantic Terms

In order to begin upon this discussion, we must first define some linguistic terms in order to clarify some of the previous discussion and to pave the way for my future assertions.

In order to assess the veridicality of a statement, we must understand entailment. Entailment is a relationship between sentences. If knowing sentence A means we know sentence B, we say that A entails B. This also means that if we were to deny sentence B, we could not feasibly assert sentence A. For example,

(4)   a.   France is full of trees.
        b.   There is a France.

Here (4a) entails (4b). We could not claim that France did not exist and still claim that it is full of trees. In order to show the entailment between (4a) and (4b) using linguistic symbols, we say that (4b) is *p*, and write: (4a) --> *p*.[2]

Giannakidou 1997 builds on the existing notions of veridicality from Montague 1969 and Zwarts 1995. She defines veridicality, nonveridicality, and averidicality as the following:

> Let *Op* be a monadic sentential operator. The following statements hold:
> (i) *Op* is veridical just in case *Op p* --> *p* is logically valid. Otherwise, *Op* is nonveridical.
> (ii) A nonveridical operator *Op* is averidical just in case *Op p* --> ¬*p* is logically valid.

Her claim is that sentence is called "veridical" if the sentence is logically true. If the sentence is not logically true, we then call it "nonveridical." If a sentence is logically false, meaning that the sentence means the opposite of the truth, then we call it "averidical." A famous example of the test of veridicality refers to the King of America.

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[2] Saeed 2005

(4)   *Op*: The King of America is bald. -->

[There is a King of America]$_p$ is not true.

[There is not a King of America]$_q$ is true.

Here we see that the statement *p* is not true. If we use the definition above, we see that by rule

(i), *p* is nonveridical. By rule (ii) we see that *p* is averidical because *q*, which is the negated form

of *p*, is true. Nonveridicality is an interesting category and one which we will discuss in greater

detail in the following section.

The Subjunctive as Nonveridical

There are many ways to analyze the Latin subjunctive. By examining when sentences[3] or

other environments select for the subjunctive, we can determine how and why the subjunctive is

used. Donatus, perhaps one of the most thorough Roman grammarians whose work is extant,

writes the following about the moods of the Latin verb:

> modi qui sunt? indicatiuus, ut *lego*, imperatiuus, ut *lege*, optatiuus, ut *utinam*
> *legerem*, coniunctiuus, ut *cum legam*, infinitiuus, ut *legere*, impersonalis, ut
> *legitur*.   (Donatus, *Ars Minor*)
> What are the moods? Indicative, as in *lego*, imperative, as in *lege*, optative, as in
> *utinam legerem*, subjunctive, as in *cum legam*, infinitive, as in *legere*, and
> impersonal, as in *legitur*.

Of course modern Latinists would take issue with Donatus' claim of a Latinate optative mood

and Donatus' confusion about impersonality being a modal property. It would have been nice

had Donatus, as a native speaker and grammarian, discussed semantics as well, however, we are

left only with Donatus' exposition of morphology. Allen & Greenough 2001 (AG) goes into

more detail.   AG divides the subjunctive use into independent and dependent uses of the

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[3] In this paper I will refer to what are commonly called in Linguistics "utterances" as "sentences." This is due to fact that the corpus of Latin with which I will be dealing is entirely from written sources. I was unfortunately unable to find a native speaker whom I could use for fieldwork.

subjunctive: the independent being Hortatory, Optative, or Dubitative; the dependent being Purpose, Result, Relative Time, Characteristic, Indirect Question, or Conditional. This division of AG is a division of the subjunctive as a dependant mood versus the subjunctive as an independent mood. We can make another sort of division here, a division based on veridicality. In order to test which of the nine independent and dependent uses of the subjunctive are nonveridical, we must test the truth conditions of the entailments in each of the nine uses.[4]

Hortatory:

(4)	hos	latrones	interficiamus
	this.pl.ACC	*robber.pl.ACC*	*kill.1.pl.SUBJ*
	'Let us kill these robbers.'		(Caesar, *de Bello Gallico*, 7.38)

The hortatory, since it deals with neither truth nor falseness, is nonveridical.

Optative[5]:

(5)	ut(i)	pereat	positum	rubigine telum
	PTL	*waste.3.sg.SUBJ*	*set aside.PART*	*rust.ABL weapon.NOM*
	'May the weapon set aside go to waste with rust.'			(Horace, *Satyrarum*, 2.1)
(6)	May the weapon set aside go to waste with rust. -->			
	[The weapon was set aside]$_p$ is true.			
	[The weapon is going to waste with rust]$_q$ is probably not true.			

We can almost assume *a priori* that the optative use of the subjunctive will be nonveridical since the speaker is expressing his wish for something that is not true, or a state which does not currently exist, to come about. Given (6), we can say that the optative is a nonveridical use of the subjunctive.

Dubitative:

(7)	an	ego	non	venirem?
	PTL	*I.NOM*	*NEG*	*come.1.sg.SUBJ*
	'Should I have not come?'			(Cicero, *Philippica Secunda*, 2.3)

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[4] Examples are taken from Allen & Greenough 2001. When the clause using the subjunctive is part of a greater sentence it is in boldface.

[5] While the title of this category can be misleading, it should be definitively stated that the optative is not its own mood in Latin, but rather just a use of the subjunctive to show a wish.

(8)   Should I have not come? -->

    [I came]$_p$ is true.

    [I did not come]$_q$ is not true.

This dubitative questioning form is used to ask a question by calling into doubt the opposite of

the truth. If one were to posit that Latin was a language in which a double negative made a

positive, in the situation of dubitative subjunctives, one could say that the negative particle "non"

with the nonveridicality provided by the subjunctive would provide for the reading p in (8)

above. Since (7) entails p, which is true, we can say that the dubitative use of the subjunctive is

veridical.

    In the following discussion of the dependent uses of the subjunctive, I will contrast the

entailment of the dependent clause alone, which will be p, against the entailment of the entire

sentence (main clause with dependent clause), which will be q.

Purpose Clauses:

    Purpose, or final clauses use the subjunctive as the main verb in a dependent clause. The

dependent clause conveys the purpose of the action in the main clause.

(9)   ab   aratro   abduxerunt   Cincinnatum,

    from   *plough.ABL*   *brought.3.pl.IND*   *Cincinnatus.ACC*

    ut   **dictator**   **esset**.

    PTL   *dictator.NOM*   *be.3.sg.SUBJ*

    'They brought Cincinnatus from the plough, so that he would be the dictator.'

                                        (Cicero, *de Finibus*, 2.4)

(10)   They$_i$[6] brought Cincinnatus from the plough, so that he would be the dictator. -->

    [Cincinnatus was the dictator]$_p$ is not true.

    [They$_i$ wanted to make Cincinnatus dictator]$_q$ is true.

In the case of purpose clauses, the implicature based on the subordinate clause, p, is nonveridical

by itself, but when put within the context of the main clause, becomes veridical. The entailment

q is true, therefore the use of the subjunctive in a purpose clause is veridical.

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[6] The subscript is to denote coreferentiality. Two words that share a subscript symbol and refer to the same person
or thing are said to be coreferential.

Result Clauses:

Result, or consecutive clauses are subordinate clauses with the subjunctive that are used to show the result of the action in the main clause.

(11)
tanta	vi	in	Pompei	equites	impetum	fecerunt
much	*vigor.DAT*	*in*	*Pompey.GEN*	*cavalry.ACC*	*attack.ACC*	*did.3.pl.IND*
ut	**eorum**		**nemo**	**consisteret**.		
PTL	*they.pl.GEN*		*no one*	*stand.3.sg.SUBJ*		

'They attacked Pompey's cavalry with such vigor that no one stood.'

(Caesar, *de Bello Civili*, 3.93.6)

(12)   They attacked Pompey's cavalry with such vigor that no one stood. -->
[No one stood]$_p$ may not be true.
[No one stood as a result of the attack]$_q$ is true.

We see something similar in (12) as we saw in (10) – the truth conditions of the subordinate sentence are dependent on the main clause. Given that q is true, we can say that subjunctives in result clauses are veridical.

Characteristic Clauses:

Clauses of characteristic can be conveyed with the subjunctive or the indicative. The subjunctive is used for nonveridical situations, whereas the indicative is used for veridical situations. (This follows our general theory that the subjunctive is used for nonveridicality.) The general sense of the subordinate clause with a subjunctive is that of a result clause, but is introduced by the article *qui*, rather than the particle *ut* as in (11).

(13)
non	is	sum	**qui**	**haec**	**fecerim**.
NEG	*he*	*be.1.sg.IND*	*who*	*this.pl.ACC*	*did.1.sg.SUBJ*

'I am not the sort of man who would have done this.'   (Bradley's Arnold §504)

(14)   I am not the sort of man who would have done this. -->
[I did this]$_p$ is not true.
[I did not do this]$_q$ may be true.

(15)
non	is	sum	**qui**	**haec**	**feci**.
NEG	*he*	*be.1.sg.IND*	*who*	*this.pl.ACC*	*did.1.sg.IND*

'I am not he who did this."

(16)   I am not he who did this. -->

       [I did this]$_p$ is not true.

       [I did not do this]$_q$ is true.

The use of the subjunctive in (13), as shown by (14), is clearly nonveridical. It is easy enough to imagine the circumstances of someone saying: "I am not the sort of man who would have done this, but given the situation I had no choice." In contrast to the indicative in (16), we can say that the use of the subjunctive in (13) is nonveridical.

Indirect Question:

Indirect questions in Latin are sentences which include a subordinate clause that are introduced by an interrogative which itself is the subject, but usually the object, of the main verb. The subordinate verb, with the exception of the future when a participle is used, is always in the subjunctive.

(18)   **quid**   ipse   **sentiam**   exponam.

       wh-.ACC myself.NOM think.1.sg.SUBJ explain.1.sg.FUT

       I myself will explain what I think.   (Cicero, *de Divinatione*, i.10)

(19)   I myself will explain what I think. -->

       [What I think]$_p$ may true.

(19) shows that the subjunctive can be used nonveridically. What Cicero thinks may in fact be true, but what is important is that it is a matter of opinion, and therefore nonveridical. There are also cases of indirect questions that use disjunction.

(20)   incertum   **num**   **hoc**   **verum**   **sit**.

       uncertain   *whether*   *this.ACC*   *true*   *be.3.sg.SUBJ*

       'It is uncertain whether this is true.'   (Bradley's Arnold §165)

(21)   It is uncertain whether this is true. -->

       [This is true]$_p$ may not be true.

       [This is false]$_q$ may not be true.

The disjunction in (21) is nonveridical, as it does not definitively entail anything other than that the speaker/author is uncertain about something. Therefore we can state that the use of the subjunctive in indirect questions is nonveridical.

Conditional Statements:

For the discussion of Conditionals, Bradley's Arnold (BA) provides a much more concise

categorization of conditional statements:

> §451. Conditional Statements can be divided into three main types according to
> the kind of condition expressed in the protasis.
>
> Type I. The condition may be so expressed that there is no implication about its
> fulfillment or probability of fulfillment. Such conditions are said to be Open
> Conditions. . . .
>
> §452. In Open Conditions the verb of the protasis is indicative; the verb of the
> apodosis may be either indicative, imperative, or a subjunctive of will or desire.
> . . .
>
> §455. Type II. The condition may be conceded only as a supposition, which
> may nor may not be fulfilled. Such conditions are sometimes called Ideal
> Conditions. . . .
>
> §456. In Ideal Conditions, the verb of both protasis and apodosis is generally
> Present subjunctive. . . . Note.—But sometimes a Perfect subjunctive is used in
> the protasis to denote an act as hypothetically completed and prior in time to the
> apodosis. . . .
>
> §457. Type III. The condition may be one which is represented as being contrary
> to known facts, or as impossible of fulfillment. Such are called Unreal
> Conditions. . . .
>
> §458. In Unreal Conditions the verb of both protasis and apodosis are
> subjunctive.[7, 8]

Upon first glance at these rules, it appears that Open Conditions will be veridical and Ideal and

Unreal Conditions will be nonveridical. In determining the truth conditions of conditionals, we

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[7] The protasis is subordinate to the apodosis. The apodosis expresses what will happen if the truth conditions of the protasis are met. "If *x*, then *y*." *x* is the protasis and *y* is the apodosis.

[8] Other descriptions, such as Wheelock's, classify Open Conditions as "Simple fact" and "Future More Vivid"; Ideal Conditions as "Should-Would" or "Future Less Vivid"; and Unreal Conditions as "Contrary to Fact". AG adds to the Wheelock-style classifications the classifications of General Conditions and Implied Conditions. A General Condition uses a second person subjunctive in the protasis and an indicative in the apodosis to express a general truth. An Implied Condition is a sentence which does not take the traditional form of a conditional, but implies a conditional sentence. More can be found in AG §310 on Implied Conditions.

can denote the protasis (called in semantics the antecedent) as *p* and the apodosis (called in semantics the consequent) as *q* and construct a truth table[9].

Open Condition:

(23) si qui exire volunt, conivere possum.
if he.pl.NOM go.INF want.3.pl.IND close eyes.INF be able.1.sg.IND
'If anyone wants to go, I can close my eyes.' (Cicero, *in Catalinam*, 2.27)

(24) [If anyone wants to go]*p*, [I can close my eyes]*q*.

p	q	p-->q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	T

The truth table here shows that the Open Conditional can only be nonveridical if anyone wants to go and Cicero (the speaker/author) cannot close his eyes. Because (23) uses the indicative, it is easy to use a truth table to analyze an Open Conditional statement. However, the Ideal Conditions might prove more difficult. Open conditionals use the indicative to show potential, but are nonetheless veridical.

Ideal Condition:

(25) quod si quis deus mihi largiatur, . . . valde recusem.
this.ACC if some.NOM god.NOM me.DAT grant.3.sg.SUBJ profusely reject.1.sg.SUBJ
If some god were to grant me this, I would profusely refuse. (Cicero, *Cato Maior*, 83)

(26) [If some god were to grant me this]*p*, [I would profusely refuse]*q*.

We do not need to construct a truth table for (26) to see that the use of the subjunctive here is nonveridical. *p* is clearly a hypothetical statement, and even if *q* was true, it still exists outside of veridicality, and therefore is also not false. Ideal conditions use the subjunctive to construct hypothetical situations, and therefore are nonveridical.

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[9] Truth tables are used to show the relationship between the truth conditions of two statements. Here I analyze the truth value of the conditional phrase as whole if the protasis and the apodosis are true or false on their own.

Unreal Condition:

(27)	hic	si	mentis	esset	suae,
	he.NOM if	*sane*	*mind.GEN*	*be.3.sg.SUBJ*	*his.GEN*
	ausus	esset	educere	exercitum.	
	venture.PART	*be.3.sg.SUBJ*	*lead out.INF*	*army.ACC*	

'If he was of a sane mind, he would have ventured to lead out the army.'

(Cicero, *in Pisonem*, 21.50)

(28)   [If he was of a sane mind]$_p$, [he would have ventured to lead out the army]$_q$.

Unreal conditions, like ideal conditions, have a nonveridical statement in the protasis. What is interesting about unreal conditions is that the protasis is averidical.[10] Therefore the apodosis must also be averidical, as it is based on an averidical assumption.

The preceding discussion has allowed us to make the following classifications: the uses of the subjunctive in Dubitative Clauses, Purpose Clauses, and Result Clauses are veridical; the uses of the subjunctive in Hortatory Clauses, Optative Clauses, Characteristic Clauses, Indirect Questions, Ideal Conditions, and Unreal Conditions are nonveridical. We see here the use of the subjunctive in Purpose and Result clauses as primarily subordination, as described by BA. The subjunctive in Dubitative Clauses serves to call something into doubt, implying nonveridicality, but is used to express a veridical notion. The other independent and dependent uses of the subjunctive show clearly that their primary function is to show nonveridicality, regardless of subordination. This begins to hint that AG is incorrect when they write:

> The Subjunctive in the subordinate clauses of Indirect Discourse has no significance except to make more distinct the fact that these clauses are subordinate; consequently no direct connection has been traced between them and the uses of the mood in simple sentences. (§577)

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[10] This notion of the protasis as averidical is based on the assumption that the speaker means to present the opposite of the truth, which is the case in counterfactual conditions. cf. Kearns 2000, ch 3.

But before we completely dismiss his claim, let us examine in greater detail the use of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua*, where subordination is most obvious and either the indicative or the subjunctive appears.

The Problem

Above we have taken common uses of the subjunctive and analyzed them to tease out notions of (non)veridicality in Latin. In (1) and (2) we see the use of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua*. The standard process of taking a sentence and putting into indirect discourse is to take the main clause of the original sentence and turn it into an AcI construction, while putting the verb of any subordinate clauses into the subjunctive. AG §577 contains the following example:

(30) a. *Oratio Obliqua[11]*

[dicit]   esse   non nullos   quorum   auctoritas

say.3.sg.IND   be.INF   NEG no one.pl.ACC   who.pl.GEN   influence.NOM

plurimum valeat.   (Caesar, *de Bello Gallico*, i.17)

most   prevail.3.sg.SUBJ

He says there are some whose influence most prevails.

b. *Oratio Recta*

sunt   non nulli   quorum   auctoritas

be.3.pl.IND NEG no one.pl.NOM who.pl.GEN influence.NOM

plurimum valet.

most   prevail.3.sg.IND

There are some whose influence most prevails.

Here we see the same statement in *oratio recta* (direct discourse), and *oratio obliqua*. In (30b) we see a sentence with the main verb, "sunt," and the verb of a relative clause, "valet," both in the indicative. When (30b) is translated into *oratio obliqua*, we see the main verb become infinitive, "esse", and "valet" become subjunctive, "valeat." According to the Kuhner-Stegman, AG, and BA, this rule is uniform for most subordinate clauses.

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[11] Since "dicit" is supplied here, we say that (30a) is an example of *Virtual Oratio Obliqua*. cf. BA §448. Sentences (30a) and (30b) come from AG §580.

However, we do see some notable exceptions. The bolded phrases are subordinate clauses that appear in the indicative. Note the two following sentences:

(31)   a. Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, **quod oppidum a Corfinio septem milium intervallo abest**, cupere ea facere, quae vellet, sed a Q. Lucretio, senatore, et Attio Peligno prohiberi, **qui id oppidum septem cohortium praesidio tenebant**. (Caesar, *de Bello Civili*, I.18)

It is announced to Caesar[12] that the people of Sulmo, a town which is a seven miles distance from Corfinium, want to do the things which he wished, but are prevented by Quintus Lucretius, senator, and Attius Pelignus, who held the town with a detachment of seven cohorts.

(32)   a. Scio fuisse nonnullos qui ita existumarunt, iuventutem **quae domum Catalinae frequentabat** parum honeste pudicitiam habuisse; sed ex aliis rebus magis quam quod cuiquam id compertum foret, haec fama valebat.

(Sallust, *Bellum Catalinae*, XIV.7)

I know there were some who thought this: young men who frequented the house of Catiline have little honest chastity. But this rumor prevailed because of other matters, rather than because anyone could find a reason of guilt.

We will be comparing (31) and (32) to (33), in which the bolded clause does use the subjunctive.

(33)   a. At enim Cn. Pompeius rogatione sua et de re et de causa iudicavit: tulit enim de caede **quae in Appia via facta esset**, **in qua P. Clodius occisus esset**.

(Cicero, *pro Milone*, XV)

But namely Gnaeus Pompeius by his motion judged both the matter and the trail: the motion namely spoke of the murder which happened on the Appian Way, in which Publius Clodius was killed.

We see in examples (31) and (32) subordinate clauses which do not appear in the subjunctive when in indirect discourse. In (31), the *oratio obliqua* is introduced by the verb "nuntiatur," meaning "it was announced." The verbs "cupere" and "prohiberi" both appear in the infinitive and "Sulmonenses," the thematic agent in the reportive clause which would normally be nominative, is accusative due to AcI construction. The clause "quae vellet" uses the subjunctive, apparently due to subordination in *oratio obliqua*. We would expect all subordinate clauses in (31) to appear in the subjunctive but there are two relative clauses of characteristic that are in the indicative:

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[12] Caesar wrote in the third person.

(31) b. quod oppidum a Corfinio   septem milium

wh-.NOM town.NOM from Corfinium.ABL seven   miles.ACC

intervallo   abest

distance.ABL be from.3.sg.IND

a town which is a seven miles distance from Corfinium

    c. qui   id   oppidum septem cohortium

wh-.pl.NOM PRON.ACC town.ACC seven cohort.pl.GEN

praesidio   tenebant

detachment.ABL held.3.pl.IND

who held the town with a detachment of seven cohorts

There is a potential semantic difference between (31b) and (31c). (31b) contains information which may or may not have been reported by the (implied) messenger. We are not sure if the messenger included in his report the distance between the two towns. The reported information in (31c) on the other hand seems to definitely be part of the message born to Caesar. This distinction we will explore in greater detail below.

   In (32) we see another of the *verba dicendi*, "scio", meaning "I know," introduce *oratio obliqua* here. We also see all the trademarks of AcI: "iuventutem" in the accusative (when thematic agents are usually nominative) and the main verb "habuisse" in the infinitive. The relative clause of characteristic here is

(32) b. quae   domum Catilinae   frequentabat

wh-.NOM house.ACC Catiline.GEN frequented.3.sg.IND

who frequented Catiline's house

This example will prove very interesting as it used in the context of Sallust building a case against Catiline. We will see that the use of the indicative here is a rhetorical device.

   Lastly, (33) is a good example of the subjunctive used to show subordination of a relative clause of characteristic in indirect discourse. We do not see AcI occur because there is no verb outside of the subordinate clause other than that which introduces the *oratio obliqua*, "tulit." The use of the subjunctive here shows that this is *oratio obliqua* because relative clauses of

characteristic of this sort[13] would otherwise be in the indicative. We have two subordinate clauses in (33):

(33) b.   quae   in Appia   via   facta   esset
             wh-.NOM   on Appian.ABL way.ABL done.PassPeri was.3.sg.SUBJ
             which happened on the Appian Way

      c.   in qua   P. Clodius   occisus   esset
             in wh-.ABL Publius.Clodius.NOM kill.PassPeri was.3.sg.SUBJ
             in which Publius Clodius was killed

(33) can serve as the control in this experiment, where we try to uncover the reason for the use of the indicative in (31) and (32).

Worlds and Veridicality in *Oratio Obliqua*

Before we can begin to analyze sentences (31) – (33), we need to develop a notion of worlds in *oratio obliqua*. In *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta* Recanati introduces the idea of simulation theory.

> The simulation theory is the view that metarepresentational prefixes such as 'John believes that' have such a pragmatic function: they indicate that the speaker is not characterizing the actual world, but, say, John's 'belief world' . . . The point of the belief ascriber is, simply, to show how the world is according to the ascribee. In both cases, according to the theory, the utterance is not a genuine assertion but an instance of pretend assertion. . . . Assertive thoughts are thoughts which we entertain concerning the actual world. But we can also entertain thoughts concerning imaginary worlds. . . . What is involved is an act of *mental* simulation: we pretend that the world is different from what it actually is, as we do when we imagine a counterfactual possibility. (Recanati 2000, 49-50)

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[13] AG makes the following distinction between relative clauses of characteristic that use the indicative as opposed to the subjunctive: "A relative clause in the Indicative merely states something *as a fact* which is true of the antecedent; a characteristic clause (in the Subjunctive) *defines* the antecedent as a person or thing of *such a character* that the statement made is true of him or it and of all others belonging to the same class." (AG §534) The meaning of this sentence is not "the motion namely spoke *of the sort of murder* that took place on the Appian Way, *which was the sort of place* where P. Clodius would have been killed." We can tell this because the previous part of the sentence specifically refers to Pompeius' motion and the use of the specifier "enim." Therefore, the sentence would normally be in the indicative, but is in the subjunctive here due to *oratio obliqua*.

Simulation theory is useful for helping us to conceptualize *oratio obliqua* in Latin. When Author X writes:

(2)   Quintus dicit stultum esse qui hoc faciat.

the author creates three worlds: the world of the ascribee (the world of Quintus), the world of the speaker (the world of Author X), and the world of the reader (our world). The *verba dicendi* serve as the metarepresentational prefixes to show that the author is characterizing the belief world of the reported speaker. In *oratio obliqua* we see a differentiation in belief. When the author writes something, that statement exists in the belief world of the author. The author is trying to share that belief with the reader, thereby bridging the worlds of the author and reader. In rhetorical writing, this is the goal of the author, namely to bring the world of the reader to coincide the world of the author.

What is written (and what is entailed) by the author is true within the world of the author. At the same time, the author can attribute certain statements to someone else, in which case those statements need only be true within the world of the ascribee; the statements do not necessarily be true in the world of the author. We would judge the statements written by the author (and not ascribed to anyone else) to be veridical in the world of the author, and the statements ascribed to someone else to be veridical in the world of the speaker. The ascribed statements may or may not be veridical in the world of the author, therefore they are nonveridical in the world of the author. In order to convey that a statement is in fact veridical in the world of the author, we would need some system within the language that allows us to show this. Latin has such a system.

In Latin the contrast in use between the indicative and subjunctive is used to show the (non)veridicality of certain statements. (cf. § "The Subjunctive as Nonveridical") In *oratio*

obliqua the shift into the subjunctive for embedded clauses is not a question of subordination. These clauses are not subject to the rules of AcI because they are not part of the main clause. The reason they shift into the subjunctive is because the author means to show that they exist only in the world of the ascribee, and not of the author. When the author deigns a statement true enough to exist in his own world, this statement will be in the indicative, in order to show that it is veridical in the author's world.

We saw in (31) and (32) three relative clauses which appeared in the indicative:

(31)   a. Caesari nuntiatur Sulmonenses, **quod oppidum a Corfinio septem milium intervallo abest**, cupere ea facere, quae vellet, sed a Q. Lucretio, senatore, et Attio Peligno prohiberi, **qui id oppidum septem cohortium praesidio tenebant**. (Caesar, *de Bello Civili*, I.18)

It is announced to Caesar that the people of Sulmo, a town which is a seven miles distance from Corfinium, want to do the things which he wished, but are prevented by Quintus Lucretius, senator, and Attius Pelignus, who held the town with a detachment of seven cohorts.

(32)   a. Scio fuisse nonnullos qui ita existumarunt, iuventutem **quae domum Catalinae frequentabat** parum honeste pudicitiam habuisse; sed ex aliis rebus magis quam quod cuiquam id compertum foret, haec fama valebat.

(Sallust, *Bellum Catilinae*, XIV.7)

I know there were some who thought this: young men who frequented the house of Catiline have little honest chastity. But this rumor prevailed because of other matters, rather than because anyone could find a reason of guilt.

In (31) there is some question as to the role of clause (31b) in the sentence. The information contained in the statement ("Sulmo and Corfinium are seven miles apart.") we can assume to be true in the world of the messenger, Caesar the author, and the reader. Furthermore, we may even want to assume that the messenger did not include this information as part of his announcement to Caesar. Nonetheless this clause of characteristic refers to 'Sulmonenses', which is in the AcI construction and therefore this embedded clause is considered part of the *oratio obliqua*. If the rule of subordination shown through the subjunctive was true, then "abest" would be "absit".

However, Caesar the author chose the indicative "abest" because the statement is veridical in not only his world as the author, but even in the world of the reader.

(31c) and (32b) are not as clear in its veridicality. We see here that these two relative clauses, which are without question within the scope of *oratio obliqua* and AcI constructions, using the indicative to convey messages that are more argumentative than just the distance between two cities. What is happening in these two examples?

In (31c) and (32b) Caesar the author and Sallust are using the distinction between the subjunctive as nonveridical and the indicative as veridical as rhetorical tools. In the passage of *de Bello Civili* from which (31c) is culled, Caesar is trying to justify his actions in sending troops to attack Lucretius and Attius. His account of the liberation of Sulmo includes a warm-greeting from the people of Sulmo and Lucretius and Attius throwing themselves from the city wall in defeat. *de Bello Civili* was written to inform the Roman nobility and senators of Caesar's actions in the war and to justify his attack against other Roman citizens. It is possible that Lucretius and Attius were not hostile to Sulmo but camped near it. However, in the way that Caesar writes his report, he must show that these Roman generals were without a doubt a danger, and therefore uses the indicative to show the unquestionable truth, at least in the world of Caesar the author, that they held the city with military force and were therefore a threat.

Sallust uses the indicative to similar purpose in *Bellum Catalinae*. Sallust was no friend to Catiline and *Bellum Catalinae* is a long treatise that paints Catiline as badly as possible. One of Sallust's arguments is that Catiline serves as a danger to the youth of Rome (interestingly similar to Meletus' accusations against Socrates), to win their support and to poison their impressionable minds. Sallust uses the indicative in "frequentabat", meaning "the youths came often," to culminate his argument and show that Catiline was in fact successful in attracting the

"iuventutem" because these youths did in fact begin to seek Catiline out. The verb "scio" introduces the *oratio obliqua* and is one of the strongest ways for Sallust to convey the veridicality within his world of the statement. To put "frequentabat" in the indicative serves only to make this point even stronger. Sallust even continues to say that it was only a rumor without truth, but his use of the indicative draws suspicion to whether he has any true disbelief in the claims it was a rumor, or if he is in fact trying to flout these claims and declare the accusations as true.

(31) and (32) clearly show the indicative in two separate uses. First as a way to convey information which is without question. The example here pertains to geographical distance. We can imagine finding other examples in Latin containing other statements deemed to be universal truths. We also see the indicative used as a rhetorical device. Caesar and Sallust make their argument using the veridicality inherent in the indicative to show that not only is a certain statement true in the world of the author, but it should also be true in the world of the reader. They use the indicative-subjunctive distinction to persuade the reader of their argument.

The Case for Superveridicality

Given these assumptions, we could posit that if a statement is in *oratio obliqua* and veridical, it should appear in the indicative. If a statement is in *oratio obliqua* and nonveridical, then it should appear in the subjunctive. However, to say this is to improperly represent the system of veridicality in *oratio obliqua*. It is possible for a statement in *oratio obliqua* to appear in the subjunctive and be veridical. Sentence (33) includes two such statements.

(33)   a. At enim Cn. Pompeius rogatione sua et de re et de causa iudicavit: tulit enim de caede **quae in Appia via facta esset**, **in qua P. Clodius occisus esset**.

(Cicero, *pro Milone*, XV)

But namely Gnaeus Pompeius by his motion judged both the matter and the trail: the motion namely spoke of the murder which happened on the Appian Way, in which Publius Clodius was killed.

Cicero does not mean to draw any sort of doubt to the fact there was a murder on the Appian Way or that it was Publius Clodius who was killed. Cicero even confirms earlier in his speech that there was such a murder. (". . . decrevi, cum caedem in Appia factam esse constaret . . ." *pro Milone*, XIV) We see here that the subjunctive can in fact be used for veridical statements in *oratio obliqua*. This does not agree with my earlier claim that the subjunctive is used to show nonveridicality and the indicative is used to show veridicality. There must be a different way in which the indicative is used.

Seeing as (31b) is a statement which is held to be in true in the worlds of the ascribee, the author, and the reader, and (31c) and (32b) are statements which the author means to be held as true in all three worlds, we can posit the existence of *superveridicality*. It is important to note that in the example from *pro Milone*, the murder of Publius Clodius on the Appian Way is true in the world of the reader. However, Cicero does not mean to reinforce this notion. This shows that the distinction lies in the intent of the author. When an author uses the indicative, the author means to give the statement more strength and to emphasize the truth of the statement. This is the motivation behind Caesar and Sallust. Cicero does not mean to deny the truth of the murder, but at the same time he does not mean to reaffirm it. Cicero's main point is not that the murder happened, and therefore he does not need to show that it is true in the world of his addressee.

Superveridicality exists when a statement is true in all three worlds. A statement is veridical if the statement is true in the world of the ascribee and the author. A statement is

nonveridical if the author ascribes it to someone else does not give evidence to its veridicality.

Therefore, superveridicality can be defined as follows:

(34) *Definition*

Let *S* be a situation, M = {M$_\varepsilon$(α), M$_\varepsilon$ (β), M$_\varepsilon$ (γ)}

Let there be three worlds:

M$_\varepsilon$(α), the world of the ascribee;

M$_\varepsilon$ (β), the world of the author;

M$_\varepsilon$ (γ), the world of the reader.

(i) *S* is veridical just in case *S p* --> *p* is logically valid in some model M$_\varepsilon$(α) or M$_\varepsilon$ (β).

(ii) *S* is superveridical just in case *S p* --> *p* is logically valid in some model M$_\varepsilon$(α, β, γ).

(iii) If (i) and (ii) do not hold for a case *S*, then *S* is nonveridical.

This definition allows us to define superveridicality as the highest standard of truth in a language. Using this model of three worlds, we can show a hierarchy of truth.[14] This hierarchy allows speakers to select the amount of credibility they wish to give to a certain statement. Superveridical phrases hold the most truth value; veridical statements hold truth as well, but less; and nonveridical statements hold no certain truth whatsoever; and averidical statements lack truth.

Conclusion

While Bradley's Arnold, Allen & Greenough, and other descriptive grammars of the Latin language claim that the role of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua* is subordination, we have seen here that the truth of a statement is far more important in mood choice. (Non)veridicality more commonly determines the role of the subjunctive.

The indicative appears in *oratio obliqua* in subordinate environments, where according to some scholars the subjunctive should be used. This indicative-subjunctive distinction in *oratio*

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[14] English has a similar hierarchy of truth and evidentiality. If a speaker believes something strongly, he would say, "I absolutely believe X." If a speaker believes something less strongly, he would say "I believe with some reservations X." If a speaker does not believe something, he would say "I doubt X." We can easily create a finer gradient by adding more phrases of strength or reservation in English.

obliqua mirrors the indicative-subjunctive difference elsewhere – it is a question of (non)veridicality. However, in *oratio obliqua* we are not only dealing with the author's writing, but also the world of reported speech. The creation of a new sphere in which to analyze veridicality forces us to shift our notions of the indicative as veridical and the subjunctive as nonveridical. *Oratio obliqua* allows the author to create three worlds: the world of the ascribee, the world of the author, and the world of the reader. By creating the world of the ascribee, the author allows himself to relinquish responsibility for a certain statement and suspend the veridicality within the world of the ascribee. The author may or may not think this statement is true. This world model and the modal system in Latin allow the speaker to leave his opinion ambiguous.

When a statement is veridical in the world of the ascribee, the world of the author, and the world of the reader, it is superveridical and therefore appears in the indicative. Universally true statements, such as geographical distances, appear in the indicative for precisely this reason. Because of this use of the superveridical indicative in *oratio obliqua*, an author can use this aspect of Latin semantics to make an argument. By presenting a claim in the same manner that one states a universally true fact, an author can show how true he believes this claim to be. In doing so, the author forces his claim into the world of the reader as veridical. Caesar and Sallust do not only use the indicative as superveridical, they use its superveridicality to develop their argument. Making a statement seem superveridical is a valuable rhetorical tool for the Roman orator and author. Being able to argue one's case in Rome was not limited to making personal connections with the powerful or calling the most reliable witnesses. A command of the Latin language was crucial, and understanding the intricacies of Latin grammar would allow a speaker to manipulate the language in a way to make the questionable become fact.

The subjunctive in Latin may appear at first to be a function of subordination. However upon further analysis, it is clear that the indicative-subjunctive mood distinction is best defined as a question of veridicality. In order to fully answer this question, *oratio obliqua* shows that the subjunctive is used to question or remove the responsibility of veridicality, and that the indicative is used to show superveridicality. This semantic category is crucial to understand Latin texts and how the Romans used their language on a day-to-day basis.

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